My first query is concerned with the pragmatic status of the two distinctions. I grant RS that both ±realis and ±definite "have to do with the pragmatic status of the referent (thing, event)" (section 4.2), in that both indicate the speaker's view of the referent, but they belong in different dimensions or subfields of pragmatics. Where ±definite basically has to do with textual coherence (and hence "the world of discourse"), ±realis has to do with the actual world 'fit' (Searle's term), and has nothing to do with the world of discourse. Imagine RS's Amele realis example (12), section 4.1, as part of an exchange:
They killed the pig as it ran out.
(B) Did they really?
(B)'s response (whose English form admittedly may not be similar in Amele) clearly shows that neither the killing or the running was already part of the world of discourse between (A) and (B). Moreover the interrogative form of the response seems to question the reality of (A)'s statement -though we know that this kind of response (in English and in several other languages) ususally indicates a willingness to listen, not doubt.
On the other hand, in the following exchange (A) makes life on Mars part of the world of discourse, but (B) converts it to irrealis:
There's life on Mars.
(B)
No, there may be life on Mars -we don't know yet.
In other words ±realis would seem to have nothing to do with grounding (RS section 7). And I don't see how an irrealis can instruct the adressee "to construe a new entity" (section 5).
My second query has to do with the analysis of definiteness; in particular, the difference between expression and content does not always emerge clearly. In fact there seem to be three pairs of distinctions in play, not just two, in that ±specific also has a "crucial role". 
NON-SPECIFIC (or GENERIC) (2)
The lion is a dangerous animal, much more dangerous than the domestic cat, simply because a lion is bigger than a cat.
In (1) I have switched the definite and indefinite articles, with the result that the text is wellnigh illegible. In (2) there is no problem, even though the distribution of articles is the same: definite at first reference, indefinite at the second. It seems that the definite-indefinite expression system fits specific reference best -in the generic (2) I can switch them round in whichever way.
However that is not the whole story. Where RS maintain that there is only one reason for an NP to be indefinite (section 6), I would maintain that there are several reasons for an NP to be indefinite. By this I mean that there are several different types of context or content (one specififying and three non-specific) that may trigger the indefinite form:
(a) it refers to a specific entity which is not (yet) part of a shared "world of discourse" (i.e. not yet identifiable by the adressee, though it must be identifiable (specifiable) by the speaker), but which will be at the next reference to it. This is the prototypical use of indefinite reference: the grounding or specifying use. Note that with plural or uncountable nouns this use is marked by the quantifier some, or a similar quantifier (Once upon a time some musicians decided that…). In the three following nonspecific types indefiniteness is unmarked in plural and uncountable NPs.
(b) it predicates (non-specifically) class membership for a specific entity (He is a teacher), or for a (generic) class (A/the lion is a carnivore), in other words it allocates that entity (or class) to a (more comprehensive) class.
(c) it predicates (non-specifically) a description of a specific entity (He is an idiot). (1)), or changes the meaning radically (as in (b) and (c), from generic to specific).
On the other hand there is basically only one reason for an NP to be definite:
that it refers to a specific entity which is already (presumed to be) part of a shared "world of discourse" (i.e. identifiable by the adressee as well as by the speaker) -even though there are several ways by which it can be "identifiable"
in the shared "world of discourse" (textually, as for instance by indefinite form But the general picture is that non-specific reference is fairly free to use either definite or indefinite reference (cf (2) This may seem rather heavy-handed, but if specificity has a "crucial role" to play, we have to be clear how it works. I admit that saying that there is only one reason for an NP to be definite, is an analyst's choice. But to say that there is only one reason for an NP to be indefinite, is (I find) a misrepresentation -my suggestion of four reasons may seem an overkill, but they are certainly different in meaning, as well as in their relation to definite expression. Anyway, the point is that the assertion of a one-many (and many-one) difference (RS section 6) is too easy to disagree with (analyst's choice).
My final point, then, is that a comparison between ±realis and ±definite has to take into account content as well expression. For one thing, when RS distinguish (in section 7) between non-specific-indefinite and specific-indefinite, I miss a reference to non-specific and specific definte. Also the term tense is used as if the content is a simple reflection of the expression, cf section 7: "When tense is used for a non-actual event, it specifies when an event was non-actual." But what about If only I had a million! -clearly the preterite is here the irrealis marker.
For another, ±realis seems to be much more variedly marked than specificity (apart from a few languages such as Amele). In fact ±realis is, in English and several other well known languages, basically a content distinction, marked by modal verbs, preterite tense, or whatever. It may even be marked by an adjective participle, as in the specific irrealis NP The alleged murderer.
The alleged similarities between ±definite and ±realis may be real. They may even be based on diachrony or metaphor (RS section 3.2-3). The explanations I have presented here, do not provide evidence either way. But I do claim to have presented evidence for a reconsideration of the comparison.
